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Abstract 
 
Being imitated has a wide range of pro-social effects, but it is not clear how these effects are 
mediated. Naturalistic studies of the effects of being imitated have not established whether 
pro-social outcomes are due to the similarity and/or the contingency between the movements 
performed by the actor and those of the imitator. Similarity is often assumed to be the active 
ingredient, but we hypothesized that contingency might also be important, since it produces 
positive affect in infants, and can be detected by phylogenetically ancient mechanisms of 
associative learning. We manipulated similarity and contingency between performed and 
observed actions in a computerized task. Similarity had no positive effects; however, 
contingency resulted in greater enjoyment of the task, reported closeness to others, and 
helping behavior. These results suggest that the pro-social effects of being imitated may rely 
on associative mechanisms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Imitation – where one agent reproduces the actions of another – plays a crucial role in social 
interaction from infancy through adult life. Being imitated by an adult makes children prefer 
that adult to another (Thelen, Dollinger, & Roberts, 1975). In adults, being imitated increases 
positive evaluation of the interaction (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Kouzakova, van Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2010; Suzuki, Takeuchi, Ishii, & Okada, 2003), 
and after being imitated people are more helpful, increase the amount they donate to charity 
(van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004), and feel closer to others 
(Ashton-James, van Baaren, Chartrand, Decety, & Karremans, 2007). These effects are not 
confined to the laboratory: waitresses who verbally imitated their customers received larger 
tips than those who simply acknowledged the order (van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van 
Knippenberg, 2003).  
 
In general, imitation in these experiments is manipulated via an interaction with a 
confederate, who either imitates or refrains from imitating the participant’s body language, 
posture, and gestures. Although this method is valuable in producing a naturalistic situation, 
it is not well-controlled: the imitation and non-imitation conditions may differ in many ways 
besides the core property, specific to imitation, of whether the participant’s actions are 
reproduced by the confederate.  For example, the number of gestures and general activity 
level of the confederate may differ between the two conditions. Furthermore, using 
naturalistic methods it is difficult to find out exactly what it is about being imitated that 
generates pro-social effects. Labeling the phenomena as effects of ‘imitation’ suggests that 
the critical factor is the similarity between the actions of the participant and the confederate; 
that pro-social effects result from the confederate producing actions that are topographically 
4 
 
isomorphic to those of the participant, e.g. touching his face when the participant touches her 
face. However, it is also possible that contingency is responsible for, or contributes to, the 
effects; that pro-sociality results from there being a predictive relationship between the 
participant’s movements and those of the confederate.  In this case, pro-sociality would result 
from interactions in which the ‘imitator’ produces a certain action after the ‘imitatee’ has 
produced another particular action – for example foot bobbing after face touching – 
regardless of whether the imitator’s actions are isomorphic to those of the imitatee. 
Naturalistic studies of the effects of being imitated are part of a broader social psychological 
literature which demonstrates that similarity between individuals results in increased 
affiliation (e.g. people prefer others who have similar attitudes to themselves; Byrne, 1961). 
Here, however, we focus specifically on action similarity: topographical isomorphism 
between the actions of social partners.  
 
It is plausible that contingency contributes to the pro-social effects of being imitated for three 
reasons.  First, there is long-standing evidence that infants, at least, enjoy contingent 
experience.  They prefer to watch contingent rather than non-contingent events, whether these 
contingencies are between two sets of environmental stimuli (Bahrick, 1983) or between the 
infant’s own actions and observed outcomes (Bahrick & Watson, 1985). They also show 
positive affect when, for example, the operation of a noisy toy, that would normally cause 
distress, is controlled by the infant’s own actions (Gunnar, Leighton, & Peleaux, 1984). Thus 
it is possible that in adults, contingent action by a social partner generates positive affect and 
thereby pro-sociality.   
 
Second, synchrony between interaction partners can have positive effects (Hove & Risen, 
2009; Miles, Nind & Macrae, 2009). For example, Hove and Risen (2009) demonstrated that 
5 
 
participants who tapped in synchrony with an experimenter liked that experimenter more than 
did participants who tapped asynchronously (not out of phase, but slower, hence non-
contingently). In such studies, the role of similarity cannot be ascertained because the 
participant and experimenter perform the same actions in both synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions.  However, for the same reason, synchrony effects demonstrate that 
the temporal relationship between interaction partners’ actions may contribute to pro-social 
effects of being imitated. 
 
Third, contingency is likely to be important because similarity between performed and 
observed actions may be difficult to compute. Consider face-touching. When I touch my face, 
I see my hand moving towards me, I do not see my face, but I feel contact between my face 
and fingers. When I watch you touching your face, I see your hand moving away from me 
towards your face, which is visible, and I do not feel any contact. Given that the sensory 
inputs are so different, how do I know that, from a third person perspective, your action is 
similar to mine: how do I detect the similarity between an action that is felt but unseen, and 
an action that is seen but unfelt?  No clearly articulated psychological theories answer this 
‘correspondence problem’ (Brass & Heyes, 2005).  Theories of how imitative behavior is 
produced (rather than detected) suggest the problem is solved in an unspecified manner by an 
innate mechanism (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997), or that production of imitative behavior does 
not require the imitator to compute the similarity between observed and executed actions 
(Heyes, 2001).  The current lack of theoretical solutions to the correspondence problem may 
be due to lack of imagination on the part of researchers, but it is also possible that the 
correspondence problem is a hard one, not only for scientists, but also for neurocognitive 
systems to solve.  In contrast, contingency can be detected by simple mechanisms, present in 
a broad range of species: the mechanisms of associative learning that produce Pavlovian and 
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instrumental conditioning. Therefore, given that similarity detection across performed and 
observed actions may require complex computations, and that contingency detection is 
known to require only simple computations, it could be adaptive for the pro-social effects of 
being imitated to depend on contingency instead of, or in addition to, similarity.   
 
The present experiment had two aims. First, we wanted to discover whether the pro-social 
effects of being imitated could be replicated in a more controlled procedure, where the 
number and type of actions performed and observed by participants are systematically varied. 
Second, we aimed to investigate the relative roles of similarity and contingency in producing 
the pro-social effects of being imitated, by varying both similarity and contingency between 
the actions performed and observed by participants. In order to accomplish this, a 
computerized imitation procedure was used. Although such a procedure differs from some of 
the more naturalistic experiments described above, it permits systematic investigation of 
similarity and contingency in a way not possible in other settings. Positive effects of imitation 
have previously been observed using highly constrained computerized procedures with 
unnatural stimuli (e.g. Bailenson, Yee, Patel & Beall, 2008, Experiment 1), but no previous 
study has manipulated both contingency and similarity across the same, natural, stimuli.  For 
example, Bailenson et al. (2008) varied contingency but not similarity using unnatural stimuli 
(colored circles), and varied similarity but not contingency using natural stimuli (avatar head 
movements).   
 
The participants’ task during the imitation treatment was to perform hand or foot lifting 
actions at random, while observing hand and foot lifting actions on the computer screen. As 
shown in Fig. 1, the observed actions varied in similarity to those performed according to a 
participant’s group assignment (similar/S+: the observed hand lifted when the participant 
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lifted their hand, and the foot lifted when they lifted their foot; dissimilar/S-: the foot lifted 
when the participant lifted their hand, and the hand lifted when they lifted their foot). 
Additionally, and orthogonally to the factor of similarity, the observed actions varied in their 
contingency with respect to those performed. In the contingent groups (C+), participants 
observed their outcome action (similar or dissimilar) whenever they performed an action, 
whereas in the non-contingent groups (C-), participants observed their outcome action on 
50% of trials, resulting in no contingency between performed and observed actions.  
 
----------------Insert Figure 1 about here---------------- 
 
In order to measure the pro-social effects of being imitated in this controlled procedure, we 
chose several measures from the literature. Since being imitated improves evaluation of the 
interaction, we assessed participants’ reported enjoyment of the task via a feedback form. 
Reported closeness to another person was measured using the Inclusion of Other in the Self 
(IOS) scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), a measure sensitive to being imitated (Ashton-
James et al., 2007). We also included the Twenty Statements Task (TST) (Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954): the proportion of interdependent responses on this measure is sometimes, 
although not always (Ashton-James et al., 2007), affected by being imitated. Finally we 
assessed helping behavior (van Baaren et al., 2004) indexed by likelihood of returning the 
next day for follow-up. 
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2. Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Eighty paid participants (22 male) were recruited through University College London 
Psychology Department’s participant database. The experiment was approved by the 
departmental Ethics Committee and performed in accordance with the 1964 Declaration of 
Helsinki. All participants gave written consent. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four groups by computer program. Thus the experimenter did not know participants’ group 
assignments until response scoring had been completed.  
 
2.2. Stimuli 
 
The imitation treatment stimuli comprised images of the resting and endpoint positions of 
hand and foot lifting actions (Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & Heyes, 2008). Both hand 
and foot were present in the resting position, centered vertically on the screen, on every trial. 
The left / right position of the hand and foot varied randomly across trials.  
 
2.3. Procedure 
 
The imitation treatment took place first. Each trial commenced with the participant pressing 
and holding hand and foot keys with their right hand and right foot. The foot key was a 
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keyboard pedal (Cherub Sustain), connected via parallel port to the computer. The 
participant’s foot was out of sight below the table. The hand key was the space bar. The 
participant’s hand was occluded by a box covering their hand and forearm. Once both keys 
were pressed, the hand and foot images appeared on the screen in the resting position. They 
remained in this position until the participant released either key with a lifting action. For 
participants in the similar, contingent group (S+C+), lifting the hand resulted in the hand on 
the screen immediately lifting to the endpoint position. After 500ms it was replaced with a 
blank screen for 1000ms, when the next trial began. Lifting the foot produced the equivalent 
outcome for the foot on the screen. For participants in the dissimilar, contingent group (S-
C+), lifting the hand produced a foot action, and lifting the foot produced a hand action. 
Participants in the non-contingent groups (S+C- and S-C-) received equivalent mappings 
between hand / foot lifting actions, and hand / foot actions on the screen (S+: hand>hand, 
foot>foot; S-: hand>foot, foot>hand), but these outcomes only occurred on 50% of trials. On 
the other trials, no outcome occurred: the hand and foot remained in the resting position for 
500ms, and were then replaced with a blank screen for 1000ms.  
 
Participants were instructed to produce roughly half hand and half foot lifting actions in the 
course of the treatment, while being as random as possible. Each participant received 400 
trials, divided into five blocks of 80 trials. An attentional task ensured participants were 
attending to the outcome of their actions. On four trials per block, rather than lifting, the hand 
or foot rotated downward by 45°. Participants were instructed to say “yes” whenever they 
detected a downward movement. The experimenter was not present in the room during the 
imitation treatment; thus these responses were recorded by Dictaphone (Edirol R1, Roland 
Corp). 
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The imitation treatment was followed by the pro-social tests. The feedback form came first. It 
was explained that this experiment had not been run before, and therefore we were interested 
in participants’ experience. Participants were asked five questions with seven-point Likert 
response scales. Since previous research has demonstrated that being imitated increases 
positive evaluation of the interaction, the question of interest was “How much did you enjoy 
the experiment? 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very much”. Four other questions were included as filler 
items. 
 
The IOS scale followed. Participants selected the picture which best described their 
relationship with the person to whom they were closest from a set of seven differentially 
overlapping circles. They also indicated whether this person was the same or different gender 
to themselves. Participants then completed the TST, providing up to 20 answers to the 
question “Who am I?” After completing these tasks, participants were unexpectedly asked 
whether they could return the following day “for a short follow-up experiment”. If they were 
able to return, a time was arranged.  
 
Finally, participants indicated whether they identified themselves as belonging to an 
individualist or collectivist culture (definitions of these terms were given if required), since 
this may influence scores on tests such as the IOS and TST (Dhawan, Roseman, Naidu, 
Thapa, & Rettek, 1995; Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Li, 2001; Uskul, Hynie, & Lalonde, 
2004), independent of any effects of the imitation treatment; they were thanked, and paid.  
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3. Results 
 
3.1. Scoring and data analysis 
 
3.1.1. Imitation treatment 
Responses to the attentional task (“yes” responses) were counted. Performance was high 
(96.3 ± 0.9% of downward movements were detected), indicating that participants were 
attending to the outcome of their actions. It is still possible, however, that participants 
differed in their level of motivation towards the task. This could result in variations in the 
imitation treatment received. For instance, participants who made multiple errors (lifting both 
hand and foot), produced very predictable patterns of actions, or deviated from the 
requirement to produce an equal number of hand and foot actions, might have had less 
opportunity to experience the similarity and contingency between their actions and those on 
the screen, than participants who did none of these things. Therefore these measures of 
imitation treatment received were calculated in the following way. Errors were expressed as 
percentage of trials on which both hand and foot were lifted. Randomness was calculated on 
the basis of the expected distribution of consecutive quadruplets of responses: the number of 
occurrences of each possible quadruplet (e.g. hand; foot; foot; hand) was counted and 
compared to that expected by chance, with closer results receiving higher scores. Finally, 
percentage of hand (versus foot) actions performed was calculated. 
 
3.1.2. Pro-social tests 
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The feedback question was coded directly from the response (1-7) given, such that a low 
score indicated low enjoyment. The IOS was coded from 1 (non-overlapping) to 7 (most 
overlapping), such that a low score indicated low closeness. Each TST statement was 
classified as independent or interdependent by two raters (Ashton-James et al., 2007). Inter-
rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) was 0.79. The proportion of interdependent statements was 
calculated for each participant, such that a low score indicated low interdependence. For 
helping behavior, whether or not participants returned the following day was noted. 
 
3.1.3. Multiple regression analyses 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the effects of similarity and contingency on 
scores for the pro-social tests (feedback, IOS and TST) while controlling for factors such as 
culture, gender, and variations in imitation treatment experienced. For each test, the following 
basic model was constructed (variations noted below). At the first level, gender, age and 
culture were entered into the model (these factors may influence scores on tests such as the 
IOS and TST; Aron et al., 1992; Dhawan et al., 1995; Gardner et al., 1999; Li, 2001; McCrae 
& Costa, 1988; Uskul et al., 2004) . At the second level, the errors, randomness scores, and 
percentage of hand actions during the imitation treatment were entered. At the third level, 
similarity, contingency, and a similarity by contingency interaction factor were entered as 
predictive factors. Similarity was coded as similar (S+): 1, dissimilar (S-): -1; contingency as 
contingent (C+): 1, non-contingent (C-): -1; the interaction factor was calculated by 
multiplying these values, thus: S+C+: 1; S+C-: -1; S-C+: -1; S-C-: 1. Since multiple 
regression is particularly sensitive to outlying values, participants were removed if their 
scores were more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean on the following measures: age; 
randomness score, proportion of hand vs. foot actions, or errors during the imitation 
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treatment. A further participant whose English was not adequate to complete the TST was 
also excluded. Data analysis was therefore performed on 70 participants (16 male) aged 18-
36 years, distributed across the groups as follows: S+C+: 19; S+C-: 17; S-C+: 16; S-C-: 18. 
All significant effects of similarity, contingency, or the similarity by contingency interaction 
factor are reported. 
 
3.2. Pro-social tests 
 
Table 1 shows the scores for each group for the pro-social tests.  
 
----------------Insert Table 1 about here---------------- 
 
3.2.1. Enjoyment (feedback) 
Multiple regression analysis revealed that similarity significantly predicted responses to the 
question “How much did you enjoy the experiment?” (β = -0.257, p = 0.033).  However, 
participants receiving similar experience enjoyed the experiment less than participants 
receiving dissimilar experience. Contingency also predicted responses to this question (β = 
0.265, p = 0.032): participants receiving contingent experience enjoyed the experiment more 
than those receiving non-contingent experience. 
 
3.2.2. Closeness (Inclusion of Other in the Self) 
A further factor, consisting of whether the other was the same or different gender to the 
participant, was entered into the multiple regression model at the second level. Multiple 
regression analysis revealed that contingency significantly predicted IOS scores (β = 0.232, p 
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= 0.029): participants receiving contingent experience rated the other as closer to themselves 
than those receiving non-contingent experience. 
 
3.2.3. TST 
Multiple regression analysis revealed no significant effects. This result supports Ashton-
James et al. (2007) who found inconsistent effects of being imitated on this measure. 
 
3.2.4. Helping behavior: returning for follow-up   
Six participants (one per similar group; two per dissimilar group) were unable to schedule a 
suitable time the next day for a follow-up experiment. Of particular interest, four participants 
(three in the similar, non-contingent and one in the dissimilar, non-contingent group; none in 
either contingent group) scheduled a time for the follow-up experiment but failed to attend, 
without informing the experimenter. The numbers of “shows” versus “no-shows” were 
submitted to two separate Chi-Square analyses with factors of similarity (similar, dissimilar) 
and contingency (contingent, non-contingent). An effect of contingency was observed (χ2(1, 
N=70) = 4.242, p = 0.039, ϕ = 0.25): participants receiving contingent experience were more 
likely to show up for the subsequent experiment than those receiving non-contingent 
experience. 
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4. Discussion 
 
We have shown that being imitated in a controlled experimental setting has effects on several 
pro-social measures. Participants receiving contingent responses to their actions – regardless 
of similarity – reported greater enjoyment of the task, greater feelings of closeness to another 
person, and were more likely to help the experimenter by returning for a follow-up 
experiment. These results suggest that in this experiment the pro-social effects of being 
imitated were due to the contingency between participants’ actions and those of the 
interaction partner.  They imply that pro-social attitudes and behavior were engendered when 
participants detected, consciously or unconsciously, that their own actions predicted or 
caused the actions of another person, regardless of whether the other person’s actions were 
the same as their own.  
 
The computerized procedure used here differs in several ways from more naturalistic studies 
of the effects of being imitated. First, the actions used were generated through apparent 
motion, rather than being videos of movements or real movements. Previously we have 
shown equivalent or greater imitation effects for movements generated through apparent 
motion as compared to real motion (Heyes et al., 2005; Press et al., 2005), suggesting that our 
results would generalize to video presentation; but these results are in need of extension: to 
more naturalistic stimuli, to more interactive settings, and to actions with different levels of 
emotional valence (e.g. body posture and facial expression). In order to manipulate 
contingency and similarity in a controlled fashion, an immersive virtual environment might 
be the best way to address these questions. 
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Second, no delay was detectable between the movements of the participant and those 
observed on the screen. In this respect, our method was similar to that used in studies of the 
pro-social effects of synchrony: in these studies, participant and experimenter movements 
occur within 100ms of each other (e.g. Hove & Risen, 2009). In more naturalistic studies, the 
delay between participant and confederate movements is not usually reported, but studies 
using virtual reality incorporate a delay of around 2-4 seconds (Bailenson et al., 2008; 
Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Kühn et al., 2010). Studies of causal learning have found 
contingency effects when outcomes were presented up to 4 seconds after participants’ actions 
(Shanks, Pearson & Dickinson, 1989), suggesting that the present contingency effects can be 
generalized to more naturalistic imitation occurring at longer delays. 
 
Third, participants were instructed to attend to the actions on the screen, and therefore it is 
likely that they were aware of these actions. This may differ from naturalistic studies in 
which it is not clear whether participants are aware of the confederate’s actions. In neither 
case, however, would awareness of the occurrence of another’s actions imply awareness of 
the contingency or similarity between one’s own and the other’s actions. Anecdotally, 
awareness that another person is imitating oneself leads to discomfort, but to our knowledge 
this has been tested only once (Bailenson et al., 2008). In that study, participants who were 
aware of being imitated rated the confederate as less trustworthy and friendly; however, these 
participants were not naïve to the possibility that imitation might occur and consequently 
their detection rates were eight times higher than a naïve group. Interestingly, the negative 
effects of detection of imitation were the same regardless of similarity: they also occurred for 
dissimilar but contingent actions. Thus, the findings of Bailenson et al. suggest that, if the 
participants in our study had detected the contingency or similarity between their actions and 
those on the screen, we should have seen negative effects of both contingency and similarity. 
17 
 
Again, the synchrony literature is relevant here: in Hove and Risen’s experiments, 
participants were aware of the experimenter’s actions but positive effects of synchrony were 
still observed. 
 
Some studies of the effects of being imitated have used “antimimicry” control conditions in 
which each of the participant’s actions is followed by one of several dissimilar actions 
performed by the imitator. For example, in the imitation condition of Kühn and colleagues 
(2010), crossing legs was always followed by crossing legs, but in the antimimicry condition, 
crossing legs was followed either by folding hands or arranging hair. Under these 
circumstances, both similarity and contingency are greater in the imitation than in the 
antimimicry condition; for example, crossing my legs is a better predictor of you crossing 
your legs in the imitation condition than it is of you folding your hands in the antimimicry 
condition.  Therefore, the fact that some studies have found greater pro-social effects in 
imitation than in antimimicry conditions does not necessarily mean that similarity, rather than 
contingency, plays a role in generating pro-sociality under naturalistic conditions. Further 
research, manipulating similarity and contingency independently under naturalistic 
conditions, will be necessary to establish whether the detection of similarity plays any role in 
linking the experience of being imitated with pro-social effects.   
 
In conclusion, the present experiment demonstrates for the first time that contingency 
between one’s own actions and experienced events, as occurs during imitation, not only 
produces positive affect in infants but also pro-social attitudes and behavior in adults.  
Contingency can be detected via the mechanisms that mediate Pavlovian and instrumental 
conditioning, and these mechanisms are known to be present in a wide range of species.  
Therefore, our results suggest that the link between imitation and pro-sociality, so important 
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in human social life, may be mediated by phylogenetically ancient processes of associative 
learning.  On a practical level, our results suggest that, when it comes to establishing rapport 
with a social partner, it may not be what you do, but when you do it.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Mean and standard error of the mean (s.e.m.) scores on the pro-social tests for the 
four imitation treatment groups. 
 Imitation Treatment Group 
 Similar Dissimilar 
 Contingent Non-contingent Contingent Non-contingent 
Pro-social test Mean s.e.m. Mean s.e.m. Mean s.e.m. Mean s.e.m. 
Enjoyment (feedback)         
How much did you enjoy 
the experiment? 
5.32 0.19 4.71 0.29 5.69 0.25 5.50 0.20 
Closeness (Inclusion of 
Other in the Self) 
4.74 0.29 4.76 0.42 5.06 0.38 4.06 0.40 
Twenty Statements Task         
Proportion of 
interdependent statements 
0.17 0.03 0.23 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.22 0.04 
Helping behavior 
(attending follow-up) 
        
Number of no-shows; 
number of shows 
0; 19 - 3; 14 - 0; 16 - 1; 17 - 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Actions observed in response to those performed by the participant for the four 
imitation treatment groups. The resting hand and foot were presented on the screen until the 
participant performed an action, after which the participant observed the same or different 
action outcome, depending on group allocation. For the non-contingent groups, on fifty 
percent of trials no outcome occurred. Left/right location of the hand and foot was 
randomized across trials. 
 
 
